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The Equity Premium: Why Is It a Puzzle?
(as corrected February 2003)
Rajnish Mehra
This article takes a critical look at the equity premium puzzle—the inability
of standard intertemporal economic models to rationalize the statistics that
have characterized U.S. financial markets over the past century. A
summary of historical returns for the United States and other
industrialized countries and an overview of the economic construct itself
are provided. The intuition behind the discrepancy between model
prediction and empirical data is explained. After detailing the research
efforts to enhance the model’s ability to replicate the empirical data, I argue
that the proposed resolutions fail along crucial dimensions. 
lmost two decades ago, Edward Prescott
and I (see Mehra and Prescott 1985) chal-
lenged the profession with a poser: The
historical U.S. equity premium (the return
earned by a risky security in excess of that earned
by a relatively risk free U.S. T-bill) is an order of
magnitude greater than can be rationalized in the
context of the standard neoclassical paradigm of
financial economics. This regularity, dubbed “the
equity premium puzzle,” has spawned a plethora
of research efforts to explain it away. In this article,
I take a retrospective look at the puzzle and criti-
cally evaluate the various attempts to solve it.1
Empirical Facts
Historical data provide a wealth of evidence docu-
menting that for more than a century, U.S. stock
returns have been considerably higher than returns
for T-bills. As Table 1 shows, the average annual
real return (that is, the inflation-adjusted return) on
the U.S. stock market for the past 110 years has been
about 7.9 percent. In the same period, the real
return on a relatively riskless security was a paltry
1.0 percent. The difference between these two
returns, 6.9 percentage points (pps), is the equity
premium. This statistical difference has been even
more pronounced in the post-World War II period.
Siegel’s (1998) data on U.S. stock and bond returns
going back to 1802 reveal a similar, although some-
what smaller, premium for the past 200 years. 
Furthermore, this pattern of excess returns to
equity holdings is not unique to U.S. capital mar-
kets. Table 2 confirms that equity returns in other
developed countries also exhibit this historical reg-
ularity when compared with the return to debt
holdings. The annual return on the U.K. stock mar-
ket, for example, was 5.7 percent in the post-WWII
period, an impressive 4.6 pp premium over the
average bond return of 1.1 percent. Similar statisti-
cal differences have been documented for France,
Germany, and Japan. And together, the United
States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, and
France account for more than 85 percent of capital-
ized global equity value. 
The dramatic investment implications of the
differential rates of return can be seen in Table 3,
which maps the enormous disparity in capital
appreciation of $1 invested in different assets for
1802–1997 and for 1926–2000.2 
This kind of long-term perspective under-
scores the remarkable wealth-building potential of
the equity premium and explains why the equity
premium is of central importance in portfolio allo-
cation decisions, in making estimates of the cost of
capital, and in the current debate about the advan-
tages of investing Social Security funds in the stock
market.
A Premium for Bearing Risk?
Why has the rate of return on stocks been signifi-
cantly higher than the rate of return on relatively
risk free assets? One intuitive answer is that stocks
are “riskier” than bonds and investors require a
premium for bearing this additional risk. Indeed,
the standard deviation of the returns to stocks
(about 20 percent a year historically) is larger than
that of the returns to T-bills (about 4 percent a year),
Rajnish Mehra is professor of finance at the University
of California, Santa Barbara, a research associate of the
National Bureau of Economic Research, and senior
investment advisor to Vega Asset Management, New
York.
AThe Equity Premium
January/February 2003 55
so obviously, stocks are considerably riskier than
bills. 
But are they? Figure 1 illustrates the variability
in the annual real rate of return on the S&P 500
Index (Panel A) and a relatively risk free security
(Panel B) over the 1889–2000 period. 
To enhance and deepen our understanding of
the risk–return trade-off in the pricing of financial
assets, we make a detour into modern asset-pricing
theory and look at why different assets yield differ-
ent rates of return. The deus ex machina in asset-
pricing theory is that assets are priced in such a way
that, ex ante, the loss in marginal utility incurred by
sacrificing current consumption and buying an
asset at a certain price is equal to the expected gain
in marginal utility contingent on the anticipated
increase in consumption when the asset pays off in
the future.
The operative concept here is “incremental loss
or gain in well-being because of consumption,” and
the concept should be differentiated from incre-
mental consumption itself. The same amount of
consumption may result in different degrees of
well-being at different times. (For example, a five-
course dinner after a heavy lunch yields consider-
ably less satisfaction than a similar dinner when
one is hungry!)
As a consequence, assets that pay off when
times are good and consumption levels are high
(i.e., when the incremental value of additional con-
sumption is low) are less desirable than those that
pay off an equivalent amount when times are bad
and additional consumption is both desirable and
more highly valued. Thus, assets that pay off when
times are good must offer a premium to induce
investors to hold them. 
Let me illustrate this principle in the context of
the standard popular paradigm, the capital asset
pricing model. The CAPM postulates a linear rela-
tionship between an asset’s beta (a measure of
Table 1. U.S. Returns, 1802–2000
Mean Real Return
Period Market Index
Relatively Riskless 
Security Risk Premium
1802–1998 7.0% 2.9% 4.1 pps
1889–2000 7.9 1.0 6.9
1926–2000 8.7 0.7 8.0
1947–2000 8.4 0.6 7.8
Sources: Data for 1802–1998 are from Siegel (1998); for 1889–2000, from Mehra and Prescott (1985),
updated by the author. The rest are the author’s estimates.
Table 2. Returns for Selected Countries, 1947–98
Mean Real Return
Country Period Market Index
Relatively Riskless 
Security Risk Premium
United Kingdom  1947–99 5.7% 1.1% 4.6 pps
Japan 1970–99 4.7 1.4 3.3
Germany 1978–97 9.8 3.2 6.6
France 1973–98 9.0 2.7 6.3
Sources: Data for the United Kingdom are from Siegel; the rest of the data are from Campbell (forthcom-
ing 2003).
Table 3. Terminal Value of $1 Invested
Stocks T-Bills
Investment Period Real Nominal Real Nominal
1802–1997  $558,945  $7,470,000  $276 $3,679
1926–2000  266.47  2,586.52 1.71 16.56
Sources: Ibbotson Associates (2001); Siegel (1998).Financial Analysts Journal
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systematic risk) and expected return. Thus, high-
beta stocks yield a high expected rate of return. In
the CAPM, good times and bad times are captured
by the return on the market. The performance of the
market, as captured by a broad-based index, acts as
a surrogate indicator for the relevant state of the
economy. A high-beta security thus tends to pay off
more when the market return is high (when times
are good and consumption is plentiful), but as just
noted, such a security provides less incremental
utility than a security that pays off when consump-
tion is low. It is less valuable to investors and,
consequently, sells for less. Thus, assets that pay off
in states of low-marginal utility will sell for a lower
price than similar assets that pay off in states of high
marginal utility. Since rates of return are inversely
proportional to asset prices, a high-beta asset will,
on average, have a higher rate of return than a low-
beta security.
Another perspective on asset pricing empha-
sizes that economic agents prefer to smooth pat-
terns of consumption over time. Assets that pay off
a relatively larger amount at times when consump-
tion is already high “destabilize” these patterns of
consumption, whereas assets that pay off when
consumption levels are low “smooth out” con-
sumption. Naturally, these latter assets are more
valuable and thus require a lower rate of return to
induce investors to hold them. (Insurance policies
are a classic example of assets that smooth con-
sumption. Individuals willingly purchase and hold
them in spite of their very low rates of return.)
To return to the original question: Are stocks
so much riskier than T-bills that a 7 pp differential
in their rates of return is justified? What came as a
surprise to many economists and researchers in
finance was the conclusion of a research paper that
Prescott and I wrote in 1979. Stocks and bonds pay
off in approximately the same states of nature or
economic scenarios, and hence, as argued earlier,
they should command approximately the same rate
of return. In fact, using standard theory to estimate
risk-adjusted returns, we found that stocks, on
average, should command, at most, a 1 pp return
premium over bills. Because for as long as we had
reliable data (about a hundred years), the mean
premium on stocks over bills was considerably and
consistently higher, we realized that we had a puz-
zle on our hands. Our paper detailing this research,
“The Equity Premium: A Puzzle,” was published
in 1985. 
To illustrate the puzzle, consider a frictionless
economy that has a single representative, “stand-
Figure 1. Real Return on S&P 500 and Relatively Riskless Asset, 1889–2000
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in” household. This household unit orders its pref-
erences over random consumption paths by
(1)
where
E0(⋅) = expectation operator conditional on
information available at time zero
(which denotes the present time)
β = subjective time discount factor
U = an increasing, continuously differen-
tiable concave utility function
ct = per capita consumption
The utility function is further restricted to be of the
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) class:
(2)
where the parameter α measures the curvature of
the utility function. When α = 1, the utility function
is defined to be logarithmic, which is the limit of
Equation 2 as α approaches 1. 
The feature that makes Equation 2 the “prefer-
ence function of choice” in much of the literature
on growth and in Real Business Cycle theory is that
it is scale invariant. Although the levels of aggre-
gate variables, such as capital stock, have increased
over time, the equilibrium return process is station-
ary. A second attractive feature is that it is one of
only two preference functions that allow for aggre-
gation and a “stand-in” (representative) agent for-
mulation that is independent of the initial
distribution of endowments. One disadvantage of
this representation is that it links risk preferences
with time preferences. With CRRA preferences,
agents who like to smooth consumption across var-
ious states of nature also prefer to smooth con-
sumption over time; that is, they dislike growth.
Specifically, the coefficient of relative risk aversion
is the reciprocal of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution. There is no fundamental economic
reason why this must be so. I revisit the implica-
tions of this issue later, in examining preference
structures that do not impose this restriction.3
For this illustration of the puzzle, assume one
productive unit that produces in period t output yt,
which is the period dividend. There is one equity
share with price pt (denominated in consumption
units) that is competitively traded; it is a claim on
the stochastic process {yt}.
Consider the intertemporal choice problem of
a typical investor at time t. He equates the loss in
utility associated with buying one additional unit
of equity to the discounted expected utility of the
resulting additional consumption next period. To
carry over one additional unit of equity, pt units of
the consumption good must be sacrificed and the
resulting loss in utility is ptU′(ct). By selling this
additional unit of equity next period, pt+1 + yt+1
additional units of the consumption good can be
consumed and βEt[(pt+1 + yt+1)U′(ct+1)] is the
expected value of the incremental utility next
period. At an optimum, these quantities must be
equal. The result is the fundamental pricing rela-
tionship:4
ptU′(ct) = βEt[(pt+1 + yt+1)U′(ct+1)]. (3)
Equation 3 is used to price both stocks and
riskless one-period bonds. For equity,
(4)
where Re,t+1 is equal to (pt+1 + yt+1)/pt. For the
riskless one-period bonds, the relevant pricing
expression is
(5)
The gross rate of return on the riskless asset, Rf, is,
by definition,
(6)
with qt as the price of the bond. 
We can rewrite Equation 4 as
1 = βEt(Mt+1Re,t+1), (7)
where Mt+1 = U′(ct+1)/U′(ct). Since U(c) is assumed
to be increasing, Mt+1 is a strictly positive stochastic
discount factor. This definition guarantees that the
economy will be arbitrage free and the law of one
price will hold.
A little algebra demonstrates that the expected
gross return on equity is5
(8)
The equity premium, Et(Re,t+1)–Rf,t+1, can
thus be easily computed. Expected asset returns
equal the risk-free rate plus a premium for bearing
risk, which depends on the covariance of the asset
returns with the marginal utility of consumption.
Assets that covary positively with consumption—
that is, assets that pay off in states when consump-
tion is high and marginal utility is low—command
a high premium because these assets “destabilize”
consumption.
The question now is: Is the magnitude of the
covariance between the assets and the marginal
E0 β
tUc t ()
t=0
∞
∑ 0 , β 1, <<
Ucα , ()c
1–α
1 α –
------------ 0 α∞ , << , =
1 βEt
U′ ct+1 ()
U′ ct ()
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U′ ct ()
--------------------- Rft +1 , , =
Rft +1 ,
1
qt
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U′ ct+1 () Ret +1 , , –
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utility of consumption large enough to justify the
observed 6 pp equity premium in U.S. equity mar-
kets? In addressing this issue, we make some addi-
tional assumptions. Although these assumptions
are not necessary and were not part of the original
Mehra–Prescott (1985) paper, they facilitate expo-
sition and result in closed-form solutions.6 These
assumptions are as follows:
• the growth rate of consumption, xt+1 ≡ ct+1/ct,
is identically and independently distributed
(i.i.d.),
• the growth rate of dividends,   is
i.i.d., and
•( xt, zt) are jointly lognormally distributed.
A consequence of these assumptions is that the
gross return on equity, Re,t, is i.i.d. and (xt,Re,t) are
jointly lognormally distributed.
Substituting U′(ct) =   in the fundamental
pricing relationship,
(9a)
we get
(9b)
It can be easily shown that the expected return on
the risky asset is7
(10)
Analogously, the gross return on the riskless asset
can be written as
(11)
Because the growth rates of consumption and
dividends are assumed to be lognormally distrib-
uted,
(12a)
and
, (12b)
where
µx = E(lnx) 
= var(lnx)
σx, z = cov(lnx, lnz) 
lnx = the  continuously  compounded growth
rate of consumption
The other terms involving z and Re are defined
analogously. Furthermore, because the growth rate
of consumption is i.i.d., the conditional and uncon-
ditional expectations are the same.
Similarly,
(13a)
and
(13b)
Therefore,
lnE(Re) – lnRf = ασx,z.( 1 4 )
In this model, it also follows that
,( 1 5 )
where 
The (log) equity premium in this model is the
product of the coefficient of risk aversion and the
covariance of the (continuously compounded)
growth rate of consumption with the (continuously
compounded) return on equity or the growth rate
of dividends. If the model equilibrium condition is
imposed that x = z (a consequence of which is the
restriction that the return on equity be perfectly
correlated with the growth rate of consumption),
we get
lnE(Re) – lnRf = (16)
and the equity premium is then the product of the
coefficient of relative risk aversion, α, and the vari-
ance of the growth rate of consumption. As we see
later, this variance,  , is 0.00125, so unless α is
large, a high equity premium is impossible. The
growth rate of consumption just does not vary
enough!
Table 4 contains the sample statistics for the
U.S. economy for the 1889–1978 period that we
reported in Mehra and Prescott (1985). 
In our calibration, we are guided by the tenet
that model parameters should meet the criteria of
zt+1 yt+1 yt ⁄ , ≡
ct
α –
pt βEt pt+1 yt+1 + ()
U′ ct+1 ()
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2
Table 4. U.S. Economy Sample Statistics, 
1889–1978
Statistic Value
Risk-free rate, Rf 1.008
Mean return on equity, E(Re) 1.0698
Mean growth rate of consumption, E(x)1 . 0 1 8
Standard deviation of growth rate of 
consumption, σ(x)0 . 0 3 6
Mean equity premium, E(Re) – Rf 0.0618 
Rf
1
βe
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cross-model verification. Not only must they be
consistent with the observations under consider-
ation, but they should not be grossly inconsistent
with other observations in growth theory, business
cycle theory, labor market behavior, and so on.
There is a wealth of evidence from various studies
that the coefficient of risk aversion, α, is a small
number, certainly less than 10.8 We can thus pose
the question: If we set risk-aversion coefficient α to
be 10 and β to be 0.99, what are the expected rates
of return and the risk premium using the parame-
terization just described?
Using the expressions derived earlier, Appen-
dix A, and Table 4,9 we have 
 
or
which is a risk-free rate of 12.7 percent!
Because
we have
E(Re) = 1.141,
or a return on equity of 14.1 percent, which implies
an equity risk premium of 1.4 pps, far lower than
the 6.18 pps historically observed.
Note that in this calculation, I was very liberal
in choosing the values for α and β. Most studies
indicate a value for α that is close to 2. If I were to
pick a lower value for β, the risk-free rate would be
even higher and the premium lower. So, the 1.4 pp
value represents the maximum equity risk pre-
mium that can be obtained, given the constraints
on α and β, in this class of models. Because the
observed equity premium is more than 6 pps, we
have a puzzle on our hands that risk considerations
alone cannot account for.
Weil (1989) dubbed the high risk-free rate
obtained in the preceding analysis “the risk-free
rate puzzle.” The short-term real rate in the United
States has averaged less than 1 percent, so the high
value of α required to generate the observed equity
premium results in an unacceptably high risk-free
rate. 
The late Fischer Black proposed that α=55
would solve the puzzle.10 Indeed, it can be shown
that the U.S. experience from 1889 through 1978
reported here can be reconciled with α = 48 and
β=0.55. To see this, observe that 
and
which implies that
Because
the implication is that β equals 0.55.
Besides postulating an unacceptably high α,
another problem is that this is a “knife edge” solu-
tion. No other set of parameters will work, and a
small change in α will lead to an unacceptably high
risk-free rate.11 
The relationship lnRf =
shows why an extremely high α can be consistent
with a “low” risk-free rate. The term 
dominates when α is very large;12 however, then a
small change in the growth rate of consumption
will have a large impact on interest rates. This is
inconsistent with a cross-country comparison of
real risk-free rates and their observed variability.
For example, throughout the 1980s, South Korea
had a much higher growth rate than the United
States but real rates were not appreciably higher.
Nor does the risk-free rate vary considerably over
time, as would be expected if α were large.
An alternative perspective on the puzzle has
been provided by Hansen and Jagannathan (1991).
The fundamental pricing equation can be written as
.( 1 7 )
Equation 17 also holds unconditionally, so 
(18a)
or
(18b)
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where ρR,M is the correlation of the return on the
security and the stochastic discount factor M. And
because –1 ≤ ρR,M ≤ 1,
(19)
This inequality is referred to as the “Hansen–
Jagannathan lower bound on the pricing kernel.”
For the U.S. economy, the long-term Sharpe
ratio, defined as [E(Re,t+1) – Rf,t+1]/σ(Re,t+1), can be
calculated to be 0.37. Because E(Mt+1) is the
expected price of a one-period risk-free bond, its
value must be close to 1. In fact, for the parameter-
ization discussed earlier, E(Mt+1) = 0.96 when α=2.
Thus, if the Hansen–Jagannathan bound is to be
satisfied, the lower bound on the standard devia-
tion for the pricing kernel must be close to 0.3.
When this lower bound is calculated in the Mehra–
Prescott framework, however, an estimate of 0.002
is obtained for σ(Mt+1), which is off by more than
an order of magnitude.
I want to emphasize that the equity premium
puzzle is a quantitative puzzle; standard theory is
consistent with our notion of risk that, on average,
stocks should return more than bonds. The puzzle
arises from the fact that the quantitative predictions
of the theory are an order of magnitude different
from what has been historically documented. The
puzzle cannot be dismissed lightly because much
of our economic intuition is based on the very class
of models that fall short so dramatically when con-
fronted with financial data. It underscores the fail-
ure of paradigms central to financial and economic
modeling to capture the characteristic that appears
to make stocks comparatively so risky. Hence, the
viability of using this class of models for any quan-
titative assessment—say, to gauge the welfare
implications of alternative stabilization policies—
is thrown open to question.
For this reason, over the past 15 years or so,
attempts to resolve the puzzle have become a major
research impetus in finance and economics. Several
generalizations of key features of the Mehra–
Prescott (1985) model have been proposed to rec-
oncile observations with theory, including alterna-
tive assumptions about preferences (Abel 1990;
Benartzi and Thaler 1995; Campbell and Cochrane
1999; Constantinides 1990; Epstein and Zin 1991),
modified probability distributions to admit rare
but disastrous events (Rietz 1988), survivorship
bias (Brown, Goetzmann, and Ross 1995), incom-
plete markets (Constantinides and Duffie 1996;
Heaton and Lucas 1997; Mankiw 1986; Storesletten,
Telmer, and Yaron 1999), and market imperfections
(Aiyagari and Gertler 1991; Alvarez and Jermann
2000; Bansal and Coleman 1996; Constantinides,
Donaldson, and Mehra 2002; Heaton and Lucas
1996; McGrattan and Prescott 2001; Storesletten et
al.). None has fully resolved the anomalies. In the
next section, I examine some of these efforts to solve
the puzzle.13
Alternative Preference Structures
The research attempting to solve the equity pre-
mium puzzle by modifying preferences can be
grouped into two broad approaches—one that calls
for modifying the conventional time-and-state-
separable utility function and another that incorpo-
rates habit formation.
Modifying the Time-and-State-Separable
Utility Function.  The analysis in the preceding
section shows that the isoelastic (CRRA) prefer-
ences used in Mehra and Prescott (1985) can be
made consistent with the observed equity pre-
mium only if the coefficient of relative risk aversion
is implausibly large. A restriction imposed by this
class of preferences is that the coefficient of risk
aversion is rigidly linked to the elasticity of inter-
temporal substitution; one is the reciprocal of the
other. The implication is that if an individual is
averse to variation of consumption in different
states at a particular point in time, then she or he
will be averse to consumption variation over time.
There is no a priori reason that this must be so. Since
on average, consumption grows over time, the
agents in the Mehra–Prescott setup have little
incentive to save. The demand for bonds is low and
the risk-free rate, as a consequence, is counter-
factually high.
To deal with this problem, Epstein and Zin
presented a class of preferences, which they termed
“generalized expected utility” (GEU), that allows
independent parameterization for the coefficient of
risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution.
In these preferences, utility is recursively
defined by
(20)
The usual isoelastic preferences follow as a special
case when α = ρ. 
The major advantage of this class of models is
that a high coefficient of risk aversion, α, does not
necessarily imply that agents will want to smooth
consumption over time. This modification has the
potential to at least resolve the risk-free rate puzzle. 
The main difficulty in testing this alternative
preference structure stems from the fact that the
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counterparts of Equations 3 and 4 when GEU is
used depend on the unobserved utility at time t + 1,
which makes calibration tricky. One would need to
make specific assumptions about the consumption
process to obtain first-order conditions in terms of
observables. 
Although Epstein and Zin claimed that their
framework offers a solution to the equity premium
puzzle, I believe that the proxies they used for the
unobservables overstate their claim. The frame-
work does ameliorate the risk-free rate puzzle, but
it does not solve the equity premium puzzle.
Habit Formation.  A second approach to
modifying preferences, initiated by Constantinides
(1990), incorporates habit formation. This formula-
tion assumes that utility is affected not only by
current consumption but also by past consump-
tion. It captures the notion that utility is a decreas-
ing function of past consumption and marginal
utility is an increasing function of past consump-
tion.
Utility is defined as
(21)
where λ is a parameter that captures the effect of
past consumption. This preference ordering makes
the agent extremely averse to consumption risk
even when the risk aversion is small. For small
changes in consumption, changes in marginal util-
ity can be large. So, although this approach cannot
solve the equity premium puzzle without invoking
extreme aversion to consumption risk, it can
address the risk-free rate puzzle because the
induced aversion to consumption risk increases the
demand for bonds, thereby reducing the risk-free
rate.
A modification of the preceding approach is to
define utility of consumption relative to average
per capita consumption. Abel termed this approach
“keeping up with the Joneses.” The idea is that
one’s utility depends not on the absolute level of
consumption but on how one is doing relative to
others. The effect is that, once again, an individual
can become extremely sensitive and averse to con-
sumption variation. Equity may have a negative
rate of return, which can result in personal con-
sumption falling relative to others’ consumption.
Equity thus becomes an undesirable asset relative
to bonds. Since average per capita consumption is
rising over time, the induced demand for bonds
with this modification helps mitigate the risk-free
rate puzzle.
An alternate approach, expounded by Camp-
bell and Cochrane, incorporates the possibility of
recession—that is, a major economic downturn—
as a state variable. In this model, the risk aversion
of investors rises dramatically when the chances of
a recession increase; thus, the model can generate
a high equity premium. Since risk aversion
increases precisely when consumption is low, it
generates a precautionary demand for bonds that
helps lower the risk-free rate. This model is consis-
tent with both consumption and asset market data.
Whether investors actually display the huge, time-
varying, countercyclical variations in risk aversion
postulated in this model is, however, open to ques-
tion. 
In summary, models with habit formation, rel-
ative consumption, or subsistence consumption
have had success in addressing the risk-free rate
puzzle but only limited success with resolving the
equity premium puzzle because in these models,
effective risk aversion and prudence become
improbably large.
Idiosyncratic and Uninsurable 
Income Risk
In infinite-horizon models, agents, when faced
with uninsurable income shocks, dynamically self-
insure; agents simply stock up on bonds when
times are good and deplete them in bad times,
thereby effectively smoothing consumption.
Hence, the difference between the equity premium
in incomplete markets and in complete markets is
small (Heaton and Lucas 1996, 1997). The analysis
changes, however, when a shock is permanent.
Constantinides and Duffie developed a model that
incorporates heterogeneity by capturing the notion
that consumers are subject to idiosyncratic income
shocks that cannot be insured away. 
Simply put, the model recognizes that consum-
ers face the risk of job loss or other major personal
disasters that cannot be hedged away or insured
against. Equities and related procyclical invest-
ments (assets whose payoffs are contingent on the
business cycle) exhibit the undesirable feature that
they drop in value when the probability of job loss
increases—as it does in recessions, for instance. In
economic downturns, consumers thus need an
extra incentive to hold equities and similar invest-
ment instruments; the equity premium can then be
rationalized as the added inducement needed to
make equities palatable to investors. This model
can generate a high risk premium, but whether the
required degree of consumption variation can be
generated in an economy populated with agents
Uc () Et β
s ct+s λct+s–1 – ()
1–α
1 α –
----------------------------------------------- , λ 0, >
s=0
∞
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displaying a relatively low level of risk aversion
remains to be seen.
Disaster States and Survivorship 
Bias
Reitz proposed a solution to the equity premium
puzzle that incorporates a small probability of a
large drop in consumption. He found that the risk-
free rate in such a scenario is much lower than the
return on an equity security. 
This model requires a 1 in 100 chance of a 25
percent decline in consumption to reconcile the
equity premium with a risk-aversion parameter of
10. Such a scenario has not been observed in the
United States for the past 100 years (the time for
which we have data). Nevertheless, one can evalu-
ate the implications of the model. 
One implication is that the real interest rate and
the probability of the occurrence of the extreme
event move inversely. For example, the perceived
probability of a recurrence of a depression was
probably high just after WWII but, subsequently,
declined over time. If real interest rates had risen
significantly as the war years receded, that evi-
dence would support the Reitz hypothesis. Simi-
larly, if the low-probability event precipitating the
large decline in consumption is interpreted to be a
nuclear war, the perceived probability of such an
event has surely varied over the past 100 years. It
must have been low before 1945, the first and only
year the atom bomb was used, and it must have
been higher before the Cuban missile crisis than
after it. If real interest rates moved with these sen-
timents as predicted, that evidence would support
Rietz’s disaster scenario. But interest rates did not
move as predicted.
Another attempt at resolving the puzzle, pro-
posed by Brown et al., focuses on survivorship bias.
The central thesis is that the ex post measured
returns reflect the premium in the United States on
a stock market that has successfully weathered the
vicissitudes of fluctuating financial fortunes. Many
other exchanges have been unsuccessful; hence, the
ex ante equity premium was low because no one
knew a priori which exchanges would survive. 
For this explanation to work, however, stock
and bond markets must be differently affected by
financial crises. One reason the effects might not be
different is that governments have expropriated
m u c h  o f  t h e  r e a l  v a l u e  o f  n o m i n a l  d e b t  b y  t h e
mechanism of unanticipated inflation. Five histor-
ical instances come readily to mind: During the
post-WWI period of German hyperinflation, hold-
ers of bonds denominated in Reich marks lost vir-
tually all of the value invested in those assets.
During the 1920s administration of Henri Poincaré
in France, bondholders lost nearly 90 percent of the
value invested in nominal debt. In the 1980s, Mex-
ican holders of dollar-denominated debt lost a siz-
able fraction of the debt’s value when the Mexican
government, in a period of rapid inflation, con-
verted the debt to pesos and limited the rate at
which the funds could be withdrawn. Bondholders
in czarist Russia and holders of Chinese debt hold-
ings after the fall of the Nationalist government
suffered a similar fate under the new communist
regimes.
These examples demonstrate that in times of
financial crises, bonds are as likely to lose value as
stocks. In every instance when, because of political
upheavals or other disasters, trading in equity has
been suspended, governments have either reneged
on their debt obligations or expropriated much of
the real value of nominal debt through unantici-
pated inflation. Thus, although survivorship bias
may have an impact on the levels of the return on
both equity and debt, researchers have no evidence
that crises affect the returns to stocks and bonds
differentially. Hence, the equity premium is not
affected.
Borrowing Constraints
In models that impose borrowing constraints and
transaction costs, these features force investors to
hold an inventory of bonds (precautionary
demand) to smooth consumption. Hence, in
infinite-horizon models with borrowing con-
straints, agents come close to equalizing their mar-
ginal rates of substitution with little effect on the
equity premium.14 Some recent attempts to resolve
the equity premium puzzle incorporating both bor-
rowing constraints and consumer heterogeneity
appear promising. One approach, which departs
from the representative agent model, was proposed
in Constantinides et al. 
The novelty of this paper is the incorporation
of a life-cycle feature to study asset pricing. The
idea is appealingly simple: The attractiveness of
equity as an asset depends on the correlation
between consumption and equity income. If equity
pays off in states of high marginal utility of con-
sumption, it will command a higher price (and,
consequently, a lower rate of return) than if its
payoff occurs in states of low marginal utility.
Because the marginal utility of consumption varies
inversely with consumption, equity will command
a high rate of return if it pays off in states when
consumption is high, and vice versa.15
The key insight of the paper is as follows: As
the correlation of equity income with consumptionThe Equity Premium
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changes over the life cycle of an individual, so does
the attractiveness of equity as an asset. Consump-
tion can be decomposed into the sum of wages and
equity income. A young person, looking forward,
has uncertain future wage and equity income. Fur-
thermore, the correlation of equity income with
consumption at this stage is not particularly high,
as long as stock and wage income are not highly
correlated. This relationship is empirically the case,
as documented by Davis and Willen (2000). Equity
will thus be a hedge against fluctuations in wages
and a “desirable” asset to hold as far as the young
are concerned.
The same asset (equity) has a very different
characteristic for middle-aged investors. Their
wage uncertainty has largely been resolved. Their
future retirement wage income is either zero or
deterministic, and the innovations (fluctuations) in
their consumption occur from fluctuations in
equity income. At this stage of the life cycle, equity
income is highly correlated with consumption.
Consumption is high when equity income is high
and equity is no longer a hedge against fluctuations
in consumption; hence, for this group, equity
requires a higher rate of return.
The characteristics of equity as an asset, there-
fore, change depending on who the predominant
holder of the equity is. Life-cycle considerations
thus become crucial for asset pricing. If equity is a
“desirable” asset for the marginal investor in the
economy, then the observed equity premium will
be low relative to an economy in which the mar-
ginal investor finds holding equity unattractive.
The deus ex machina is the stage in the life cycle of
the marginal investor.
Constantinides et al. argued that the young,
who should (in an economy without frictions and
with complete contracting) be holding equity, are
effectively shut out of this market because of bor-
rowing constraints. They have low wages; so, ide-
ally, they would like to smooth lifetime
consumption by borrowing against future wage
income (consuming a part of the loan and investing
the rest in higher-returning equity). They are pre-
vented from doing so, however, because human
capital alone does not collateralize major loans in
modern economies (for reasons of moral hazard
and adverse selection).
In the presence of borrowing constraints,
equity is thus exclusively priced by middle-aged
investors and the equity premium is high. If the
borrowing constraint were to be relaxed, the young
would borrow to purchase equity, thereby raising
the bond yield. The increase in the bond yield
would induce the middle-aged to shift their port-
folio holdings from equity to bonds. The increase
in the demand for equity by the young and the
decrease in the demand for equity by the middle-
aged would work in opposite directions. On bal-
ance, the effect in the Constantinides et al. model is
to increase both the equity and the bond return
while simultaneously shrinking the equity pre-
mium. Furthermore, the relaxation of the borrow-
ing constraint reduces the net demand for bonds—
and the risk-free rate puzzle re-emerges.
Liquidity Premium
Bansal and Coleman developed a monetary model
that offers an explanation of the equity premium.
In their model, assets other than money play a key
role by facilitating transactions, which affects the
rate of return they offer in equilibrium.
To motivate the importance of considering the
role of a variety of assets in facilitating transactions,
Bansal and Coleman argued that, on the margin,
the transaction-service return of money relative to
interest-bearing checking accounts should be the
interest rate paid on these accounts. They estimated
this rate, based on the rate offered on NOW
accounts for the period they analyzed, to be 6 per-
cent. Because this number is substantial, they sug-
gested that other money-like assets may also
implicitly include a transaction-service component
in their return. Insofar as T-bills and equity have
different service components built into their
returns, the Bansal–Coleman argument may offer
an explanation for the observed equity premium.
In fact, if this service-component differential were
about 5 percent, there would be no equity premium
puzzle. 
This approach can be challenged, however, on
three accounts. First, the bulk of T-bill holdings are
concentrated in institutions, which do not use them
as compensatory balances for checking accounts;
thus, it is difficult to accept that they have a signif-
icant transaction-service component. Second, the
returns on NOW and other interest-bearing
accounts have varied over time. For most of the
20th century, checking accounts were not interest
bearing, and returns were higher after 1980 than in
earlier periods. Yet, contrary to the implications of
this model, the equity premium did not diminish
in the post-1980 period, when (presumably) the
implied transaction-service component was the
greatest. Finally, this model implies a significant
yield differential between T-bills and long-term
government bonds, which (presumably) do not
have a significant transaction-service component.
However, such a yield differential has not been
observed.Financial Analysts Journal
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Taxes
McGrattan and Prescott proposed an explanation
for the equity premium based on changes in tax
rates. (An important aspect to keep in mind is that
their thesis is not a risk-based explanation. They
can account for an equity premium but not as an
equity  risk premium.) McGrattan and Prescott
found that, at least in the post-WWII period, the
equity premium is not puzzling. They argued that
the large reduction in individual income tax rates
and the increased opportunity to shelter income
from taxation led to a doubling of equity prices
between 1960 and 2000. And this increase in equity
prices led, in turn, to much higher ex post returns
on equity than on debt.
This argument can be illustrated by use of a
simple one-sector (a corporate sector) model that
includes only taxes on corporate distributions and
taxes on corporate profits. The authors extended
the model to include sufficient details from the U.S.
economy—especially in relation to the tax code—
to allow them to calibrate the model. They matched
up the model with data from the National Income
and Product Accounts (NIPA) and the Statistics of
Income (SOI) from the Internal Revenue Service. 
The model is detailed as follows. Consider a
representative-agent economy of infinite life with
household preferences defined over consumption
and leisure. Each household chooses sequences of
consumption and leisure to maximize utility, 
(22)
subject to the household’s budget constraint:
(23)
where
ct = per capita consumption at time t
lt =  fraction of productive time allocated
to nonmarket activities, such as leisure 
Vt  =  price per share
st  =  number of shares held in period t 
dt  = dividends
wt  = wages
κt  = government  transfers
τpers  = personal  taxes
The fraction of time allocated by households to
market activities is denoted by nt = 1 – lt. The budget
constraint represents the condition that the present
discounted value of expenditures must be less than
or equal to the discounted value of after-tax
income. Expenditures of the household are con-
sumption and purchases of stocks, Vt(st+1 – st).
Income for the households is received from three
sources—dividends, wages, and government
transfers. Households pay personal taxes, τpers, on
dividend and wage income.
Companies own capital and hire labor to pro-
duce output with a constant-return-to-scale pro-
duction technology,
yt = f(km,t,ku,t,ξtnt). (24)
where
km  = tangible assets 
ku = intangible assets 
n  = labor services 
ξt  = level of technology in period t 
Equation 24 thus assumes that companies use both
tangible assets and intangible assets to produce
output y. Tangible assets include structures, equip-
ment, inventory, and land. Intangible assets are the
result of on-the-job training, research and develop-
ment, and organization and company-specific
know-how. In addition to capital, labor services, n,
are required. The level of technology in period t, ξt,
is assumed to grow at rate γ. 
Companies choose capital and labor to maxi-
mize the present value of dividends. In this frame-
work, therefore, the value of corporate equity, Vt, is
Vt = (1 – τpers)[km,t+1 + (1 – τcorp) ku,t+1]. (25)
Equation 25 makes clear that a large drop in the
personal tax rate with little change in the corporate
tax rate, τcorp, will indeed raise the value of equity.
However, to show that the market value of U.S.
corporate equity relative to GNP, V/y, rises with a
decline in the personal tax rate with little change in
the corporate tax rate, the capital-to-output ratio
must not change with changes in τpers, only with
changes in τcorp. McGrattan and Prescott demon-
strate this in their paper.
In the United States, corporate income tax rates
have changed little since 1960 whereas personal
income tax rates have declined significantly. In
particular, personal tax rates in the period prior to
the tax cuts initiated by the John F. Kennedy admin-
istration were considerably higher than in the
period after the Tax Reform Act of 1986. McGrattan
and Prescott argued that this reduction in personal
tax rates was largely unforeseen and that the large
unanticipated increase in equity prices had a signif-
icant effect on equity returns.
As an illustration, the authors proposed the
following hypothetical example. Suppose the tax
max β′Uc t lt , () 0 ,
t=0
∞
∑ β 1, <<
pt ct Vt st+1 st – () + []
t=0
∞
∑
pt 1 τpers – () dtst wtnt + () κ t + [] ,
t=0
∞
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rate on dividends were to fall from 50 percent to 0
in 40 years. This fall in the tax rate implies that
equity prices would grow by approximately 1.8 pps
a year higher than the growth in the GNP. Growth
in per capita GNP over the post-WWII period has
been 2 percent a year; the growth in population was
roughly 1.5 percent in the early part of the postwar
period and fell to about 1 percent a year toward the
end of the period. Thus, their model would predict
an average growth in equity prices of 4.8–5.3 per-
cent a year over the 40-year period. To compute a
return, a dividend yield must be added to this price
rise. The rise in equity prices implies a fall in the
dividend yield because the dividend output ratio
stays roughly constant. If the dividend yield were,
on average, in the range of 3–4 percent, then equity
returns would be in the range of 7.8–9.3 percent, a
figure that is of the same magnitude as documented
in Table 2 for the post-WWII period.
Additionally, if households are assumed to
have a liquidity motive for holding debt, bond
returns would be low and the resulting equity pre-
mium would be large. The low yield on debt would
be reinforced by the additional demand for debt
induced by constraints on individuals to hold their
retirement assets in debt securities. Indeed, in the
first half of the post-WWII period, pension fund
assets were almost entirely invested in debt securi-
ties because of institutional restrictions on pension
fund managers. Before 1974, when ERISA made
pension plan fiduciaries personally liable for
imprudence or misconduct, fiduciary breaches typ-
ically resulted in a loss of tax qualification for the
pension fund. Such penalties were likely to be
avoidable if pension fund managers held debt
assets of various maturities so as to avoid large
fund losses and to facilitate the timing of the distri-
bution of benefits.
A potential calibration problem with the
McGrattan–Prescott model arises because of the
difficulty in identifying the marginal investor.
Although the marginal tax rate has dramatically
declined in the post-WWII period, the same cannot
be said about the rates that apply to the marginal
investor unless the marginal investor can be identi-
fied. The marginal tax rate and the rate that applies
to the marginal investor may be quite different, and
of course, it is the rate that applies to the marginal
investor that is relevant for pricing. To estimate the
tax rate that applies to the marginal investor,
McGrattan and Prescott computed a weighted-
average rate, averaged across income groups, for
each year in the 1947–96 period. The accuracy of this
estimate, however, is open to question.
The McGrattan–Prescott model predicts that,
eventually, as the dividend yield falls and tax rates
level out, everything else being equal, equity
returns will decline for the following reason. The
real before-tax return on equity is the sum of three
returns—the dividend yield, the anticipated capital
gain, and the unanticipated capital gain. The divi-
dend yield has been high (more than 3 percent) for
much of the post-WWII period because high tax
rates have implied a low price of equity. Recently,
it has declined, and it is presently just over 1 per-
cent. The anticipated capital gain is the growth rate
of productive assets, which is roughly 3 percent.
This growth rate has not changed. The unantici-
pated capital gain is the growth in the price of
equity as a result of unanticipated changes in tax
rates. This growth rate has changed—falling from a
range of 1.5–2.0 percent to 0. Adding these rates
leads to about an expected (3 + 3 + 2 percent) 8
percent real, before-tax stock return in the early
post-WWII period and, barring any further unex-
pected changes in tax rates, a (1 + 3 + 0 percent) 4
percent return in the future.
No Premium?
An alternative point of view held by a group of
academicians and professionals is that currently
there is no equity premium and, by implication, no
equity premium puzzle. To address these claims,
two different interpretations of the term “equity
premium” must be distinguished. One is the ex post
o r  r e a l i z e d  e q u i t y  p r e m i u m .  T h i s  f i g u r e  i s  t h e
actual, historically observed difference between the
return on the market, as captured by a stock index,
and the risk-free rate, as proxied by the return on
government bills. This premium is what Prescott
and I addressed in our 1985 paper. The other
(related) concept is the ex ante equity premium. This
figure is a forward-looking measure of the pre-
mium—that is, the equity premium that is expected
to prevail in the future or the conditional equity
premium given the current state of the economy.
For example, after a bull market, stock valuations
are high relative to fundamentals, the market has
risen sharply, and the ex post (realized) equity pre-
mium is high, but such a time is precisely when the
ex ante (expected) equity premium is likely to be
low. Conversely, after a major downward correc-
tion, the realized premium will be low whereas the
expected premium is likely to be high. This rela-
tionship should not come as a surprise, because
returns to stock have been documented to be mean
reverting.
Which of these interpretations of the equity
premium is relevant for an investment advisor?
Clearly, the choice depends on the planning hori-
zon. The equity premium documented in our 1985Financial Analysts Journal
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paper reflects very long investment horizons. It has
little to do with what the premium is going to be in
the next couple of years. The ex post equity pre-
mium is the realization of a stochastic process over
a certain period, and it has varied considerably over
time. 
Furthermore, the variation in the realized pre-
mium depends on the time horizon over which it is
measured. In some periods, it has even been nega-
tive, as illustrated in Figure 2. 
Market watchers and other professionals who
are interested in short-term investment planning
will wish to project the conditional, expected equity
premium over their planning horizon. This task is
by no means simple. Even if the equity premium in
current market conditions is small (and the general
consensus is that it is), it does not imply that either
the historical premium was too high or that the
equity premium has diminished. 
Figure 2. Risk Premium, 1926–2000
Source: Ibbotson (2001).
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The data used to document the equity pre-
mium over the past 100 years are as good an eco-
nomic data set as analysts have, and a span of 100
years is a long series when it comes to economic
data. Before the equity premium is dismissed, not
only do researchers need to understand the
observed phenomena, but they also need a plausi-
ble explanation as to why the future is likely to be
any different from the past. In the absence of this
explanation, and on the basis of what is currently
known, I make the following claim: Over the long
term, the equity premium is likely to be similar to
what it has been in the past and returns to invest-
ment in equity will continue to substantially dom-
inate returns to investment in T-bills for investors
with a long planning horizon.
I thank George Constantinides, Sanjiv Das, John
Donaldson, Mark Rubinstein, and especially, Edward
Prescott for helpful discussions and Chaitanya Mehra
for editorial assistance. This research was supported by
a grant from the Academic Senate of the University of
California. 
Appendix A. Lognormal 
Properties and Derivations
Some facts about the lognormal distribution follow: 
1. If lnz ∼ N(µz,) ,  t h e n  alnz ∼ N(aµz, a2 ).
2.
3. alnz + blnx ∼ N(aµz + bµx, a2 + b2
+ 2abρσxσz), where ρ = cor(lnx, lnz).
4.
5. If x = z, then
6.
7.
hence,
8. ;
hence,
Derivation of Equation 8.  Expanding Equa-
tion 7 results in
Substituting for Rf,t+1 from the following equation,
results in
which is Equation 8 in the article.
Derivation of Equations 10–13.  Because  pt
is homogeneous of degree 1 in y, we can represent
it as
pt = wyt.
Substituting for U′(ct) = ct
–α and pt in the following
fundamental pricing relationship, 
results in
hence,
or
By definition, Re,t+1, the gross rate of return on
equity, is
Substituting for pt, we get
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or
Because
we have
which is Equation 10 in the text.
Analogously, the gross return on the riskless
asset can be written as
Using the lognormal properties of Fact 2 and Fact
4, we get
and
Taking logs on both sides results in
and
Notes
1. For an elaboration of the issues presented here, see Mehra
(2002) and Mehra and Prescott (forthcoming 2003); some
sections of this article closely follow the exposition in that
paper. For current approaches to solving the equity risk
premium puzzle, see the presentations and discussions at
www.aimrpubs.org/ap/home.html from AIMR’s Equity
Risk Premium Forum.
2. The calculations in Table 3 assume that all payments to the
underlying asset, such as dividend payments to stock and
interest payments to bonds, were reinvested and that no
taxes were paid.
3. See Epstein and Zin (1991) and Weil (1989).
4. Versions of this expression can be found in Rubinstein
(1976), Lucas (1978), Breeden (1979), Prescott and Mehra
(1980), and Donaldson and Mehra (1984), among others.
Excellent textbook treatments of asset pricing are available
in Cochrane (2001), Danthine and Donaldson (2001), Duffie
(2001), and LeRoy and Werner (2001).
5. The derivation is given in Appendix A.
6. The exposition in the text is based on Abel (1988) and his
unpublished notes. I thank him for sharing them with me.
7. The derivation of Equations 10–13 is given in Appendix A.
8. A number of these studies are documented in Mehra and
Prescott (1985).
9. For instance, to get  , we use Fact 7 and plug in var(x) and
E(x) from Table 4. The properties of the lognormal distribu-
tion are documented in Appendix A.
10. Private communication, 1981.
11. An alternate approach is to experiment with negative time
preferences; however, there seems to be no empirical evi-
dence that agents do have such preferences.
12. Kandel and Stambaugh (1991) suggested this approach.
13. See also the excellent surveys by Kocherlakota (1996),
Cochrane (1997), and Campbell (forthcoming 2003).
14. This is true unless the supply of bonds is unrealistically low.
See Aiyagari and Gertler.
15. This argument is precisely the reason high-beta stocks in
the simple CAPM framework have a high rate of return. In
that model, the return on the market is a proxy for consump-
tion. High-beta stocks pay off when the market return is
high (i.e., when marginal utility is low); hence, their price
is (relatively) low and their rate of return, relatively high.
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